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HISTORICISM AND HOLISM:
FAILURES OF ORIGINALIST TRANSLATION
Jonathan Gienapp*
INTRODUCTION
For as long as the U.S. Constitution has existed, Americans have
appealed to the history of its creation to interpret its meaning. But only
since the advent of originalism—the well-known constitutional theory that
requires interpreting the Constitution today in accordance with its original
meaning—has historical study been so immediately implicated by
constitutional interpretation. Despite potential, though, for meaningful
exchange between originalists and historians, little has taken place. That
originalism plays an ever-growing role in contemporary political culture
only makes the lack of dialogue all the more unfortunate.
For these reasons, Lawrence Solum and Saul Cornell’s recent exchange
provokes a refreshing, long-overdue debate that ultimately implicates a
fundamental issue: What relationship does historical inquiry as practiced
by professional historians have to the theories of originalism that legal
scholars have refined?1 At first glance, Cornell’s claim that the recovery of
original meaning would necessarily involve historical reasoning as
historians practice it seems intuitive.2 Solum, however, contends that
historical methods play a far more limited role in this recovery than
historians would like to believe. Indeed, he effectively argues for an
originalism without history.
That is tendentiously put, as Solum
acknowledges that originalists must draw upon the eighteenth-century
American past. Nevertheless, he thinks the goal can be accomplished
largely without traditional historical knowledge or practice.
This argument suffers from several fatal difficulties, however, and none
more problematic than its treatment of a central matter implicated by any
kind of originalism: historical translation. The Constitution has a different
meaning now than it did when it was created, so recovering its original
* Assistant Professor of History, Stanford University.
1. See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional
Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 722
(2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV.
1111, 1113 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory];
Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Solum, The Fixation Thesis];
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and History (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review) [hereinafter Solum, Originalism and History].
2. Cornell, supra note 1, at 725–40.
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meaning requires engaging in some kind of translation that will transform
the Constitution back into its eighteenth-century form (or transform the
eighteenth-century Constitution into twenty-first-century language).
Originalists, led by Solum, acknowledge the centrality of this requirement,
but misunderstand what it entails. By failing to historicize the American
Founding, their method of translation proceeds from the faulty premise that
the Founding generation and we today occupy more or less the same
linguistic world, an assumption that enables their translation to take a
narrow and atomistic form. Accordingly, as a result of this failure to
historicize, they fail to appreciate the holistic character of meaning—that
individual utterances earn their meaning based on how they fit into a
linguistic whole—and, accordingly, target the wrong object of
interpretation, focusing on individual words and statements when they must
first grasp the broader idioms from which those component parts issued.
By appreciating the necessity of historicism, and with that the holistic
requirements of meaning and translation, it becomes clear that no matter
which sort of original meaning is targeted, the only suitable method of
translation is an avowedly historical one.
I. ORIGINALISM WITHOUT HISTORY
Solum marginalizes historians in at least three unpersuasive ways. First,
he confuses originalist method and theory. Second, he claims that
originalists and historians target distinct kinds of meaning. Finally, he
contends that historians cannot provide the necessary method to discover
the appropriate kind of original meaning.
A. Theory or Method?
Solum downgrades history, first, by confusing the issue, by needlessly
exploring the potential for intellectual history to replace constitutional
interpretation.3 No historian has ever suggested that this is a proper use for
history, so proving that such an imaginary project is misguided is a
distraction. The question that should be explored is: What role should
historical method play in understanding what the Constitution meant circa
1787 through 1788 (or at any other relevant historical moment)?
Subsequent implications for constitutional theory and jurisprudence are
matters entirely separate from the purely methodological issue of
recovering original meaning.
B. What Kind of Meaning?
But even when Solum correctly focuses on the methodological debate, he
is clear that historians can play no more than a “supplementary and
complementary” role in the recovery of original meaning because
“[o]riginalists and historians have different understandings of ‘meaning’
that reflect fundamentally different purposes of constitutional history and
3. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1112–14.
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contemporary originalist practice.”4 The kind of meaning that originalists
are after is what he calls “communicative content,” the elucidation of which
leads Solum to reiterate a set of interlocking arguments he has made in
several other settings.5 Constitutional meaning is divided into two
categories—communicative content and legal content—and two activities
that discover them—interpretation and construction.6 Communicative
content should not be confused with legal effect. But, it should also not be
confused with other kinds of meanings, either the “motivations or purposes”
that lay behind its construction or the “consequences or applications” that
might have been expected to follow from it.7 Communicative content is
simply the “meaning of a text in the linguistic sense,” and because this kind
of meaning “is not the primary aim of historians,” they cannot offer
originalists “a distinctive method for the determination of the
communicative content of the constitutional text.”8 Thus, historians who
insist that originalists need to acquire a deeper familiarity with historical
practice are simply guilty of “conceptual confusion.”9
Solum is partial to communicative content because he champions “public
meaning originalism.”10 As is by now well-known, this brand of the theory
privileges the original public meaning of the Constitution over the
subjective intent of its Framers, the subjective understanding of its ratifiers,
and the expected applications that many originally assumed would follow
from the document.11 Dominant today among originalists, public meaning
originalism is built on a conventions-based understanding of language,
which means both that meaning is regulated by publicly shared conventions
and that the only constitutional meaning that can have legal force is its

4. Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 1; see also Solum, Intellectual
History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1155.
5. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 453, 455 n.3 (2013); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and
Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 480 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Communicative
Content and Legal Content]; Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 924 (2009) [hereinafter Solum, District of Columbia
v. Heller and Originalism]; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten
Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1937 [hereinafter Solum, Originalism and the
Unwritten Constitution]; Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Il. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008).
6. This distinction pervades Solum’s writings, but also has proved critical in recent
originalist scholarship. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 129 (2011); KEITH
E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING 3 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOYOLA L.
REV. 611, 622 (1999).
7. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1123, 1115–
16.
8. Id. at 1155; Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 1, 2.
9. Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 1; see Solum, Intellectual History
As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1164.
10. Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 1.
11. For the shift to public meaning originalism, see Keith E. Whittington, Originalism:
A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377 (2013); Keith E. Whittington, The
New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609–10 (2004).
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conventional one. Unlike in ordinary conversation, public meaning
originalists argue, great distances (geographic and contextual) separated
speaker and audience when the Constitution was created, meaning that
those who initially probed the Constitution did not have access to the
communicative intentions of its Framers (especially not the complex
drafting history that accounted for its creation). Instead, they only had
access to the text itself and the linguistic conventions at the disposal of any
competent reader.12 Moreover, because the document was a product of
popular approval, all that can be enforceable is what a person competent in
Founding-era linguistic conventions would have taken it to mean.13 Solum
privileges communicative content because of these justifications.14
C. What Kind of Method?
There are many ways to critique Solum’s narrow conception of
communicative content, including by insisting that Founding-era intent and
understanding cannot be so easily bracketed from public meaning.15 But,
conceding for now (no matter how problematic it might otherwise be) that
originalists can exclusively target conventions-based meaning, is Solum
justified in thinking that by narrowing the target he has escaped reliance on
history? He implies that if authorial intents, expected purposes, or other
kinds of meaning were indeed the object of interpretation, then traditional
historical methods would prove necessary. Are similar methods really not
relevant to discovering public meaning?
Put another way, no matter which kind of constitutional meaning Solum
privileges, he still needs a method of historical translation.
He
acknowledges as much because language changes over time, affording
words different meanings than they once had, a notable fact for any
12. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113, 1115 (2003).
13. See generally JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE
GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
14. See Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, supra note 5, at 494–502,
507 (explaining the communication constraints inherent to the Constitution); Solum,
Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, supra note 5, at 1937–38 (describing the
conventional character of language); Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 11–12
(explaining the normative-historical justification of public meaning originalism); id. at 16–
17 (claiming that the Framers’ intentions, if discoverable, likely converged with the public
meaning of the text).
15. This point has been emphasized by several constitutional scholars and historians
alike. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why
Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 968 (2004);
Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, The Second Amendment, and Originalist
Methodology: A Critical Comment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1541, 1544 (2009); Richard S. Kay,
Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
703, 704 (2009); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 556–60 (2003); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or,
The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 586 (2011);
William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 504 (2007).
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originalist because, according to what Solum has called the “fixation
thesis,”16 “original meaning was fixed or determined at the time each
provision of the [C]onstitution was framed and ratified.”17 The matter thus
comes down to this: for Solum’s broader claim about the relationship
between history and originalism to stand, it is not enough to pinpoint
communicative content as the goal of interpretation; he must also
demonstrate how he can translate communicative content back into its
original form without requiring historical methods. Solum stakes his
argument to a distinction in meaning: originalists target public meaning,
historians something else. But this distinction is insufficient, for no matter
which kind of original meaning he privileges, he must demonstrate that he
can recover it without the historical translation techniques practiced by
historians. Only then can public meaning originalists claim to have escaped
reliance on history.
If Solum’s argument rests on his method, rather than its object, how,
then, does Solum propose locating original communicative content? His
approach begins with identifying the simple meaning of various words or
phrases, or their combination based on the operative rules of grammar,
which he variously calls “plain meaning,” “literal meaning,” or “semantic
meaning.”18 Some of these meanings might have differed in the eighteenth
century, so the interpreter must study the patterns of Founding-era linguistic
usage to grasp original semantic meaning.19 Of course, this definitional and
grammarian work can be done well or poorly, as illustrated by some
notoriously flawed originalist work.20 But assuming semantic meaning is
recovered in a credible way, it is important to recognize, Solum explains,
that it is not communicative content because legal utterances typically
communicate far more than their literal content. “The gap between
semantic content and full communicative content is filled by what we can
call ‘contextual enrichment,’” which requires two things.21 The first is to
set the Constitution in the “publicly available context of constitutional
communication” that existed at the time of its inception.22 The second
requirement is to grasp the lessons of pragmatic enrichment drawn from the
philosophy of language, which really seems to mean the work of Paul

16. Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 12, 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (ebook).
17. Id.; see Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1150
(acknowledging that originalism must avoid anachronism); Solum, The Fixation Thesis,
supra note 1, at 13–16, 62–68 (identifying “linguistic drift”).
18. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1116–18,
1125–26.
19. Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 12–13.
20. Cornell, supra note 1, at 740–42; David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment
Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written
Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295, 1302 (2009).
21. Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 2, 13.
22. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, supra note 5, at 1942.
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Grice.23 Because lots of things go without saying, these techniques are
necessary to grasp what was presupposed or implied by constitutional
utterances.24 Solum spends far more time discussing Grice than eighteenthcentury linguistic usage for reasons that, while only implied, profoundly
shape his argument. Repeatedly, he suggests that philosophy, in being
conceptually prior to history, enables originalists to bypass the latter.
Accordingly, as originalists have dedicated themselves to Grice (some of
them anyway), they are on surer interpretive footing than historians. And,
to the extent that historians have turned to language philosophy, doing so
only reinforces Solum’s deeper point: that originalist method is not
grounded in history. So then it would seem that attention to Founding-era
semantic usage plus, especially, appreciation of Grice, provides originalists
with a complete, historian-free method.
To be sure, Solum does not speak for all public meaning originalists, let
alone all originalists. But given what they have otherwise argued, it is hard
to believe that any leading public meaning originalist would dispute the
fundamental logic of Solum’s method.25 Meanwhile, even if other
originalists were to take issue, public meaning originalism has come to so
dominate the field that the point would still be of far-reaching significance.
Thus, if Solum’s conception of originalist translation cannot withstand
scrutiny, then such a revelation sheds light more broadly on the originalismhistory relationship.
II. ISSUES WITH ORIGINALIST TRANSLATION:
HOLISM AND HISTORICISM
Solum can escape historical method only if he presents a workable
alternative method, a method that can satisfactorily recover some kind of
original constitutional meaning without doing what historians do.
Ultimately, though, his method, like so many commonly found in originalist
work, suffers from major deficiencies. Understanding these failings, as
well as the makings of a suitable alternative, reveals why, contrary to
Solum’s insistence, historical method and practice is in fact essential to any
brand of originalism.
To adequately map all aspects of a proper method of originalist
translation is beyond the scope of this brief response, even if the focus is
limited just to public meaning. But, as a beginning, I will attend to two
critical aspects of historical translation, indeed perhaps the most important
ones and certainly the ones that most immediately correct the deficiencies
in Solum’s method. Recovering any meaning—and especially the public
meaning—of a historical text is simply impossible without appreciating
these two critical aspects of historical translation.
23. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1125–32;
Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 13–14.
24. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional History, supra note 1, at 1125–32.
25. See BALKIN, supra note 6, at 3–58; RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 389–95 (2014); MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT,
supra note 13, at 123–26; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 15–28.
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A. Meaning Holism
The first of these is “meaning holism,” the doctrine that the meaning of
the part only be understood by situating it in the context of the whole. The
meaning of individual linguistic components—words, phrases, or
utterances—can only be understood in terms of their relations within the
conceptual vocabulary of which they are a part.
Solum and other originalists fail to grasp this point. Rather than seeing
meaning and translation holistically, they conceive of it in thoroughly
atomistic terms, believing that effective translation can be conducted at the
level of term-for-term without engaging in any broader form of substitution.
Solum’s favorite examples of translation—“domestic violence” in the
eighteenth century and “deer” in the twelfth—are substituted against an
otherwise steady background of putative conceptual objects being picked
out.26 He unwittingly keeps the structure of linguistic conventions constant
between present and past while merely filling in that structure with discreet
component content.
But this approach fails to fully construe language as a social convention,
that is, an intersubjectively constructed set of norms. Public meaning
originalism is entirely premised on the fact that linguistic meaning is
conventional, yet at least Solum advances a decidedly shallow brand of
linguistic conventionalism. Language, in being a social practice, is
necessarily contingent, a fact that applies as much to the structure of
conventions as to the individual meanings of words within that structure.
One is reminded of Clifford Geertz’s objection that human scientists have
all too often problematically set the diversity of culture against the unity of
the human mind. The things thought are multiple, but the mode of thinking
itself is assumed unitary across space and time.27 Applied to language, this
powerful distinction juxtaposes the cacophony of different linguistic uses
with a unifying structure of logical linguistic relations presumed to underlie
the entirety of that diversity.28 Holistic translation nullifies this distinction
by targeting the logical sinews of language every bit as much as its discreet
parts. It translates all of language.

26. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, supra note 5, at 945–46;
Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 1, at 15–16.
27. Clifford Geertz, The Way We Think Now: Toward an Ethnography of Modern
Thought, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 147,
152–53 (1983).
28. As a crucial upshot of the linguistic turn in philosophy was recognition that having a
mind is, in essence, having the ability to use a language, Geertz’s observation about the
human mind proves all the more applicable to understanding human language. See, e.g.,
ROBERT B. BRANDOM, PERSPECTIVES ON PRAGMATISM: CLASSICAL, RECENT, AND
CONTEMPORARY 22–23 (2011); MICHAEL DUMMETT, FREGE: PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
(1993); 4 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AS CULTURAL POLITICS 176 (2007); RICHARD
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); WILFRID SELLARS, EMPIRICISM
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1997); Donald Davidson, Seeing Through Language, in
TRUTH, LANGUAGE, AND HISTORY 127–41 (2005).
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B. Historicism: The Foreignness of the Founding Era
Solum and many originalists unwittingly adopt their atomistic mode of
translation because interpretation commonly takes this form. Novel
remarks are typically uttered by speakers inhabiting more or less the same
conceptual and linguistic world as the listener. By sharing this background,
the speaker and listener already share enough of the whole language to
make atomistic translation possible. But when the utterance is not made
today but instead several hundred years ago, in a very different conceptuallinguistic world than the one in which we currently reside, matters change,
and decisively so. Originalists’ flawed method of translation is a direct
result of failing to appreciate this crucial lesson. They uncritically assume
that the Founding generation and we more or less reside in the same
linguistic-conceptual world. So even though they acknowledge differences
between the Founders’ usage of words and our own, critically, originalists
set such differences against a common linguistic structure apparently shared
by all.
But the first key to understanding the American Founding is appreciating
that it is a foreign world. Originalists talk often about recovering the “lost
constitution,” but with little awareness for why it merits this label.29 Not
because modern justices have abandoned it, but because its original
meaning has been obscured by changes in conceptual vocabulary.
Understanding the American Founding, and recovering the “lost
constitution,” requires appreciating this historical distance. “The past is a
different world,” as Bernard Bailyn has aptly instructed.30 “Whether one
moves away from oneself in cultural space or in historical time,” Rhys Isaac
has added in the same vein, “one does not go far before one is in a world
where the taken-for-granted must cease to be so . . . . Ways must be found
of attaining an understanding of the meanings that the inhabitants of other
worlds have given to their own everyday customs.”31 Grasping these
unfamiliar meanings involves historicizing the past and reckoning with it on
its own foreign terms.32 It involves, as Bailyn has put it, “penetrat[ing] into
the substructures of thought and behavior, into the silent assumptions, the
perceptual maps, the interior experiences that shape overt expressions and
events” to decode “the perceptual universes of the participants.”33
For modern Americans, perhaps few past periods seem more
recognizable—in terms of the questions its people asked, the concepts they
deployed, the theories they generated, the causes they endorsed, and the
issues they debated—than the American Founding.
But, in fact,
appreciating the inherent differentness of the past is most important when it
29. See generally BARNETT, supra note 25; Lino A. Graglia, How the Constitution
Disappeared, in STILL THE LAW OF THE LAND? 37–61 (1987).
30. BERNARD BAILYN, SOMETIMES AN ART: NINE ESSAYS ON HISTORY 22 (2015).
31. RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 1740–1790, at 5 (1999).
32. For more on historicism, see generally Jonathan Gienapp, Using Beard to Overcome
Beardianism: Charles Beard’s Forgotten Historicism and the Ideas-Interests Dichotomy, 29
CONST. COMMENT. 367 (2014).
33. BAILYN, supra note 30, at 22.
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seems otherwise familiar. The field-changing scholarship of Bernard
Bailyn and Gordon Wood that long ago revised our understanding of the
Revolutionary era was driven by precisely this insight, beginning from the
premise that the revolutionaries’ guiding assumptions were different than
our own and that their distinct linguistic behavior needed to be grasped on
its own terms.34 As Wood himself put it in his magnum opus, The Creation
of the American Republic, “As I explored [the revolutionaries’] pattern of
beliefs, it became evident that” the prevailing interpretive approach to the
American Founding had “been deeply ahistorical, there had been too little
sense of the irretrievability and differentness of the eighteenth-century
world.”35 Those who assume that no such historicism is required to
understand the Founding generation will be chronically perplexed by that
generation’s seemingly paradoxical obsession with representation but
apathy toward voting, their state-level debates over bicameralism that
showed little interest in the separation of powers, and their simultaneous
obsession with bills of rights and commitment to test oaths. Examples of
this kind could be indefinitely multiplied. But by understanding the
Founders’ uncommon vocabulary, such confusion washes away. In the
process, crucially, the parts that appear familiar take on different meanings.
Historicism and holism can be taken to extreme lengths—and have been by
some in the past36—but that lesson should not minimize their essential
importance.
Solum, like most originalists, perpetuates the flawed assumption that
Founding-era utterances are fairly easy to understand because they were
spoken and written in English.37
As he problematically asserts,
“[C]ontemporary American English is not identical to late eighteenthcentury American English. In many particular cases, however, the
contemporary meanings of the words and phrases in the constitutional text
today are identical to the meanings at the time the Constitution was framed
34. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800 (1993); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969). For more on the historiographical revolution they
initiated, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST.
11, 22 (1992).
35. WOOD, supra note 34, at xvi. Ironically and revealingly, originalists often cite
Wood’s masterful study approvingly, with little awareness that its fundamental conceit often
undermines much of what they are otherwise arguing. For an illustrative example, see
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
887, 933–34 (2003).
36. For discussions of such extremes, see Mark Bevir, Why Historical Distance Is Not a
Problem, 50 HIST. AND THEORY 24, 24 (2011); Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a
Conceptual Scheme, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 183–98 (2001); A. P.
Martinich, A Moderate Logic of the History of Ideas, 73 J. HIST. IDEAS 609, 610 (2012);
Richard Rorty, The World Well Lost, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 3, 4 (1982).
37. This problem is pervasive. See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 13;
Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539,
1540 (2005). For legal scholars who have issued versions of these lessons to no avail, see,
for example, Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387
(2003); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 673 (1987).
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and ratified.”38 Similarly, to explain that understanding historical texts
requires no prior knowledge of an author’s motivations or background, on
another occasion he blithely asserts:
When you encounter a stranger who shares competence with you in a
natural language (English), then usually you can communicate about a
wide variety of topics with very thin information about the
stranger . . . rely[ing] on widely shared conventional semantic meanings
and the kind of contextual information that strangers are likely to
possess.39

According to Solum, making sense of Alexander Hamilton, William
Findley, or the average man on the eighteenth-century street (a popular
public meaning originalist figure) is as simple as confronting an Englishspeaking stranger today, because it can be happily assumed that both parties
share a common semantic structure and common abilities for
contextualizing discursive antics.
To the contrary, recovering eighteenth-century communicative content
requires putting aside our working linguistic knowledge—how we trace
logical connections between meanings, how we enrich ambiguous
utterances, and how we relate meaning to context—and replacing it with
Founding-era linguistic knowledge. Because Solum and other originalists
fail to historicize, they fail to grasp the necessity of holistic translation.
III. TOWARD REMEDYING ORIGINALIST TRANSLATION
Appreciating the lessons of historicism and linguistic holism do not just
expose the deficiencies of originalists’ most popular brand of historical
translation, but also help supply a remedy. More is needed. Many critical
and related points cry out for examination, and, in work currently in
progress, I attempt to map all of the relevant contours of originalist
translation.40 Nonetheless, drawing attention to holism and historicism
furnishes an essential start.
A. The Convergence of History and Philosophy
The holistic-historicist point is not only the cure for many kinds of
originalism, but it is also precisely the one upon which much edifying work
in the philosophy of language and intellectual and cultural history have
commonly converged. Neither is prior to the other, and each could be
emphasized independently. Indeed, one could absorb a great deal about
historicism and holism purely by studying historical work—either
implicitly from empirical studies or explicitly from penetrating
methodological pieces.41 However, because Solum and other public
38. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, supra note 5, at 498.
39. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1144.
40. See generally Jonathan Gienapp, Historical Translation and Constitutional
Originalism (Sept. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
41. Examples abound. See, e.g., KEITH MICHAEL BAKER, INVENTING THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON FRENCH POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1990);
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meaning originalists suggest that they can bypass history by way of
philosophy, it is of the utmost importance to shine a light on the
philosophical path of this convergence. While I could easily draw upon
historians’ methodological reflections to reach similar points, and while I
can gladly agree with Jack Rakove that historians can “happily pass their
lives without worrying how much allegiance they owe to the work of
Chomsky, Austin, Wittgenstein, or . . . Grice,”42 given Solum’s selected
tact, it is critical to meet him on his chosen ground. While philosophy does
not afford foundations (as Solum at times implies), it does offer powerful
tools, ones that strikingly reinforce historians’ own methodological
instincts.43 Thus, the most effective way to reveal why historical practice is
indispensable for originalism is to place an emphasis, at least for now, on
how language philosophy otherwise points in that direction.
Moreover, Solum’s portrayal of language philosophy is effectively based
on one philosopher—Paul Grice—who is presented almost folk heroically,
as evidently the key to unlocking all constitutional mysteries. While
Grice’s standing in modern philosophy is undeniable, because he never
investigated what was necessary to bridge historical differences between
speaker and listener, compared to other leading philosophers he offers much
less to specifically originalist interpretive inquiries.44 Indeed, his work is
only of use after the Constitution has been translated and does not
otherwise help on this front. The work of a different cadre of analytic
philosophers of language provides a much more useful collection of tools
for the matter at hand, tools that parallel many of those that leading
intellectual and cultural historians have themselves sharpened.
B. Skinner and Wittgenstein
To better see this convergence of intellectual history and analytic
language philosophy, we ought to begin with the intellectual historian who
has drawn most consciously and extensively upon analytic philosophy and
about whom Solum has the most to say: Quentin Skinner. Perhaps because
others have alerted him that Skinner’s arguments do damage to his own,
Solum goes to considerable, vituperative lengths to try to expose Skinner’s
mistakes. Where he could have simply dismissed Skinner’s work on the
MARK BEVIR, THE LOGIC OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1999); ELIZABETH A. CLARK, HISTORY,
THEORY, TEXT: HISTORIANS AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN (2004); IAN HACKING, HISTORICAL
ONTOLOGY (2002); J. G. A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY, CHIEFLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1985); WILLIAM
H. SEWELL, JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY: SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION (2005);
Gabrielle M. Spiegel, History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle
Ages, 65 SPECULUM 59, 59–86 (1990).
42. Rakove, supra note 15, at 588.
43. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1122, 1128–
29 (betraying an almost Kantian commitment to the logical priority of philosophical
reasoning in contending that any historical or legal account of communication must be
reconciled with the work of philosophers and linguists). My proposed understanding of the
relationship between philosophy and history echoes that of PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY (Richard
Rorty et al. eds., 1984).
44. See generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989).
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basis of relevance (for simply targeting the wrong kind of textual meaning),
he instead opts for theoretical incompetence, contending that Skinner is
“deeply confused” about interpretive method itself.45 Clearly this is the
place to start in understanding Solum’s missteps, because highlighting how
Solum misses Skinner’s historicism and holism helps to reveal precisely
what Solum’s method of historical translation lacks.
At first glance, it is no small irony that Solum finds Skinner so offensive.
After all, Skinner was a thorough-going linguistic conventionalist who was
almost exclusively interested in public meaning. Interpretive efforts, he
felt, needed to begin with an understanding of texts as speech acts and, thus,
“the conventions surrounding the performance of” them.46 Moreover, he
claimed that both dimensions of meaning that were essential to textual
interpretation—locutionary meaning (an utterance’s sense and reference)
and illocutionary force (the meaning of making such an utterance)—fully
derived from publicly legible conventions. Skinner certainly stressed the
importance of recovering authorial intent, but always intent in acting as
opposed to intent to act.47 He had no interest in confusing motive with
intent and thus no interest in confusing mental states that preceded speech
acts with the public meaning of performing such acts. The intentions that
most interested him were to be “inferred from an understanding of the
significance of the act itself.”48 As Skinner famously argued, the meaning
(understood as the force) of Machiavelli’s well-known advice in The
Prince, that a prince “should know how to follow evil courses if he must,”49
varied depending on whether all other contemporaneous advice books for
princes offered identical advice or none did.50 This was not a matter of
prior mental states or subjective aims. It was concerned with the public
meaning of that statement to a reader immersed in the relevant
communicative context.
What about any of this should merit Solum’s opposition? Skinner’s
convention-based understanding of both linguistic meaning and
performative utterances seems to parallel the approach defended by Solum
and other public meaning originalists. Skinner’s disaggregation of
illocutionary intent from either prior motive or anticipated goal squares
precisely with what Solum gets at in his extended Gricean discussion of
communicative intentions.51 Skinner’s distinction between locutionary
meaning and illocutionary force parallels Solum’s own distinction between
45. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1153; Solum,
Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 26.
46. Quentin Skinner, “Social Meaning” and the Explanation of Social Action, in
MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 94 (James Tully ed., 1988).
47. On this point, Skinner is frequently misunderstood. For his clearest statement, see
Quentin Skinner, A Reply to My Critics, in MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND
HIS CRITICS, supra note 46, at 231, 278–80.
48. Id. at 279.
49. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, reprinted in 36 THE HARVARD CLASSICS 1, 68 (Charles
W. Eliot ed., 1910).
50. Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in MEANING
AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS, supra note 46, at 61–63.
51. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1132–36.
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semantic meaning and contextual enrichment.52 Skinner’s insistence that
deciphering illocutionary force requires “delineat[ing] the whole range of
communications which could have been conventionally performed on the
given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance”53 sounds strikingly
similar to Solum’s own insistence that meaning must be enriched based on
the public context of conventional communication. Maybe Solum does not
fully grasp the inner logic of Skinner’s approach. But there must be some
awareness of these parallels because one of the two major criticisms that
Solum levels against Skinner is that, in relying so heavily on Grice’s
account of “speaker’s meaning,” Skinner turns out to be little more than an
originalist. The parallels in this regard are actually stronger still. For to the
extent that Solum draws any distinction on this front between Skinner and
himself, it is only that Skinner appears to privilege original intentions
originalism.
Except, as Solum himself tells us, “under normal
circumstances, the communicative intentions of the author of a legal text
will converge with the public meaning of a text,” meaning that public
meaning originalists and sophisticated original intent originalists are after
much the same thing.54 Add to this that Skinner’s most compelling critics
have assailed him for too simply reducing authorial intent to ruling
linguistic conventions, for believing that “the intentions with which anyone
performs any successful act of communication must, ex hypothesi, be
publicly legible,” and the similarities are more striking.55
Yet, despite all of this, Solum clearly has no interest in enlisting Skinner
as an ally, as illustrated by his second major criticism, in which he criticizes
Skinner not on the basis of being banal, but for being confused, by
paradoxically weaving together a Gricean account of illocutionary
performances with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s meaning-use doctrine.56 Solum
assumes that by equating meaning with use, Wittgenstein must have been
saying what has otherwise been advanced by many critics of originalism:
that “the meaning of an expression is the use to which it [was] put,”57 a
formulation poised to fallaciously equate communicative content with
purposes or motives. Thus, in simultaneously using Grice (and gesturing

52. Perhaps by favorably citing A. P. Martinich, Four Senses of “Meaning” in the
History of Ideas: Quentin Skinner’s Theory of Historical Interpretation, 3 J. OF PHIL. &
HIST. 225 (2009), Solum disagrees that illocutionary force is an important part of public
meaning. But Martinich’s criticism is only that sentences, not entire texts, can have
illocutionary dimensions, an accommodation that might lead us to question whether the
Constitution conceived as a single utterance carries illocutionary force, but not one that
denies that its clauses have such force.
53. Skinner, supra note 50, at 63–64.
54. Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 17; see also Solum, Intellectual
History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1134.
55. Skinner, supra note 47, at 279. For Skinner’s most penetrating critic, see Bevir,
supra note 36, at 40–50, 135–36 (arguing that “linguistic meaning,” which is established on
the basis of conventions, cannot fix “hermeneutic meaning,” which is the intended
performance of a specific utterance).
56. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1151.
57. Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 25 (alteration in original).
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toward communicative content) and Wittgenstein (and diverting from it),
Skinner’s project proved incoherent.
We historians might have reason to thank Solum for exposing such a
false idol. But it is not Skinner who is confused. Solum is certainly right
that Skinner’s reliance on Wittgenstein is of the utmost importance, but not
for the reasons he identifies. Better understanding why Skinner made
extensive use of Wittgenstein requires comprehending what the AustrianBritish philosopher actually meant by his well-known dictum that linguistic
meaning follows linguistic use. According to Solum:
It is true that Wittgenstein is associated with the notion that meaning is
use, or as he put it, “Words are deeds.” The idea is that the meaning of an
expression is the use to which it is put. Wittgenstein was onto something,
but it was not a theory of communicative content. Words are used to
accomplish deeds, but the deeds are not the meaning of the words in the
relevant sense of meaning. We can extend Wittgenstein’s observation
about words to texts. Put crudely, texts can be used to accomplish deeds.
Locke’s Second Treatise could be part of Lord Shaftesbury’s political
program. Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan could be restoration ideology.
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice could be an apology for the Great
Society. There is nothing wrong with calling the political purposes of
these historical texts their “meaning,” so long as we are clear that this is
not their meaning in the sense of communicative content.58

Whatever Solum might mean here, this is absolutely not what the later
Wittgenstein meant when he famously wrote: “For a large class of
cases . . . in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus:
the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”59 Far from abandoning a
search for communicative content, Wittgenstein instead was describing
precisely what was necessary to grasp it: holism and historicism.
The later Wittgenstein was casting doubt on the classic representational
picture of language (in which the content of sentences was a product of the
prelinguistic referents that words sought to mirror) and putting in its place a
functionalist account of meaning (in which the content of sentences was a
product of how words were used in contingent discursive contexts).60 For
too long, he felt, philosophers had been obsessed with pinning down the
essential meanings of words by locating the concepts that those words
putatively represented. He began Philosophical Investigations, his most
important work, with the central features of this picture: “[E]very word has
a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for
which the word stands.”61 The assumption was that there was something
essentially common to all possible uses of a word that, by capturing its
uniform essence, amounted to its meaning. But to isolate this meaning—
58. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 1151–52.
59. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43, at 20e (G. E. M.
Anscombe trans., 1953). For how Wittgenstein’s later work was a dramatic revisal of his
earlier philosophy, see Richard Rorty, Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn, in PHILOSOPHY
AS CULTURE POLITICS 160, 160–75 (2007).
60. See Rorty, supra note 59, at 160–75.
61. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 59, pt. I.
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these necessary and sufficient conditions for using a word—philosophers
had been forced to abstract language from its messy, everyday contexts in
order to analyze it in the sublime setting of pure logic.62 Consequently,
Wittgenstein surmised, they would do so at the cost of learning anything
about linguistic meaning at all. As he wrote, “We have got on to slippery
ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are
ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to
walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!”63 By analogy,
philosophers had effectively tried to analyze a single chess piece or chess
move, removed from the context of the game of chess itself. Only when the
chess piece was returned to the context of the game could one understand
the moves that could be made with it. The same went for language: only
when language was returned to the messy reality of its everyday usage
could usage, and thus meaning, be illuminated.
In this regard, Wittgenstein likened using language to playing a game in
order to recapture that it was a situated, contextualized activity.64
Philosophers had gone wrong assuming that language had a single purpose,
when it was evident that it had a multiplicity of purposes captured in the
multiplicity of “language games” that people played.65 Depending on the
language game one was playing—whether one was giving an order,
describing an object, or making a joke—language functioned differently.
Each of these games exhibited regularities, or what Wittgenstein called
“grammars,” that governed their operations. But such grammars were
implicit, built-in norms rather than technical, formal rules given down from
on high. Just as there was no essential, underlying structure to all games
(basketball, cricket, hide and seek)—but rather only what could be called
family resemblances—there was no common feature, only numerous
overlaps, in the multiplicity of ways in which people used words and
sentences. Meaning varied depending on the language game in question.66
Because Wittgenstein saw language as fundamentally a social practice—
rather than as a medium essentially tied to something external—he
considered the constitutive elements of language to be contingent and
historical. Language games were subject to change. “[T]his multiplicity is
not something fixed, given once for all . . . new types of language, new
language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become
obsolete and get forgotten.”67 To study language historically, then, was not
simply to study different individual uses of words but, far more broadly, to
study the different language games at play. To isolate an utterance from
62. Wittgenstein was referring to the long representationalist tradition in philosophy,
stretching back to Plato, but more immediately to then dominant trends in analytic
philosophy, particularly logical positivism, which tried to break language down to its atomic
properties to engage in logical conceptual analysis. See id. §§ 23, 46.
63. Id. § 107.
64. Id. §§ 7–42.
65. Id. § 7 (discussing the concept for the first time).
66. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY § 65 (G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von
Wright eds., Denis Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1969).
67. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 59, § 23.
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this context meant imposing the interpreter’s own language games on the
utterance and, in so doing, obscuring its original meaning.
Thus, a Wittgensteinean reading of a historical text would not, pace
Solum, focus on the purposes to which the text was being put. Instead, it
would situate the utterances that make up the text in the original language
game (or games) in which they developed. Restoring original meaning was
thus primarily about recovering original language games. In other words, it
necessitated holism. By construing meaning as use, Wittgenstein was not
abandoning communicative content in favor of purposes, but instead
explaining what was actually entailed in grasping it.
Three conclusions can be drawn from these Wittgensteinean insights.
First, Skinner’s reliance on Wittgenstein was not incoherent. Indeed, most
of the speech act theorists upon whom Skinner drew took Wittgenstein’s
turn toward ordinary language as their inspiration.68 Skinner’s approach
might well demand refinement, and there are those whom Solum favorably
cites who suggest just this, but these criticisms are not premised on the
notion that Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy constitute
mutually exclusive approaches—far from it.69
Second, beyond redeeming Skinner’s coherence, appreciating Skinner’s
reliance on Wittgenstein reveals how, despite otherwise sharing an
interpretive commitment to linguistic conventionalism, Skinner is
nonetheless deeply at odds with public meaning originalists. The
divergence is not explained by Skinner’s inconsistency or infidelity (that, as
Solum claims, Skinner turns out to be an inauthentic originalist). To the
contrary, Skinner diverges from constitutional originalists because he turns
out, by comparison, to be a far more authentic public meaning originalist
and precisely because he appreciated Wittgenstein’s foundational
philosophical lessons—that an appropriately historicist brand of public
meaning requires contextualizing original utterances holistically. Indeed,
Skinner had a penetrating understanding of the foreignness of the past. His
methodological writings were largely aimed at those (then dominant in the
history of political thought) who tended to read historical texts in deeply
ahistorical and decontextualized ways, confident that great texts were
autonomous from their time and place because their authors spoke to eternal
problems.70 Far from being autonomous, Skinner argued that historical
texts were a product of reigning linguistic conventions, ones that were often
strange in light of our own. In the place of an ahistorical essentialism that
placed texts in the transhistorical context of perennial debates, Skinner
opted for a historicist nominalism. He refused to see words as a transitory
medium through which thinkers accessed unchanging concepts and instead
saw concepts as an extension of knowing how to contingently use words.
While Plato, Machiavelli, and Hobbes might all have referenced the “state,”
their uses of the word—regulated by such distinct language games—were

68. See, e.g., J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
69. See generally Martinich, supra note 52.
70. See Skinner, supra note 50, at 43–56.
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so different that it proved illusory to assume that they were picking out
identical concepts.71 Accordingly, Skinner grasped that anybody interested
in extracting the original public meaning of a text needed to see how a word
specifically functioned in the language games of its epoch.
While Skinner helps illustrate the virtues of a Wittgensteinean approach,
the third, and most important, conclusion to draw takes us well beyond
Skinner. It is now much clearer why whole languages must be the object of
originalist translation. Because the original meaning of an utterance cannot
be separated from the language game in which it appeared, translation
cannot atomistically focus on individual words or expressions. In order to
properly elucidate any single Founding-era utterance, it is imperative that it
be restored to its original discursive context, understood just as
Wittgenstein described.
C. Wittgenstein’s Successors
Leading philosophers—chief among them Donald Davidson and Robert
Brandom—have picked up where Wittgenstein left off, extending his
historicism and holism.72 As Davidson has argued,
If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure, and we
understand the meaning of each item in the structure only as an
abstraction from the totality of sentences in which it features, then we can
give the meaning of any sentence (or word) only by giving the meaning of
every sentence (and word) in the language.73

Put succinctly, “[O]nly in the context of the language does a sentence (and
therefore a word) have a meaning.”74 These holists vividly reveal the
limitations of atomistic originalist translation by tackling two important
targets that undergird it: semantic atomism and the meaning-belief
distinction.
Semantic atomism is premised on the belief that semantic properties can
be supplied to individual linguistic units independent of the attribution of
other such properties. Purely through the powers of reference or ostensive
definition one can intelligibly grasp the meaning of a word. The essential
attributes of a semantic term, in other words, can be isolated from the rest
of a language.
The holistic doctrine of inferentialism challenges this atomism by
asserting that a sentence’s semantic content is a product of the inferential
relations it has with other sentences. No single sentence (like no single
perceptual experience) can have conceptual content on its own. This point
was first introduced vis-à-vis the tradition of atomistic empiricism, most
prominently by Wilfrid Sellars, who referred to the atomistic account of

71. See Skinner, supra note 47, at 278–81.
72. The best overview of post-Wittgensteinean work on specifically these themes is
Richard Rorty’s Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn. See Rorty, supra note 59, at 176.
73. Davidson, supra note 36, at 17, 22.
74. Id.
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knowledge by acquaintance as “the Myth of the Given.”75 He argued that
such so-called knowledge by acquaintance improperly conflated causation
with justification, or the physical processes that caused an empirical episode
with the ability to count that episode as evidence for knowing something.
For it to qualify as the latter, that is to have propositional conceptual
content, one would also have to know how to inferentially relate it to lots of
other beliefs or, more simply, to know how to use it as a logical premise or
conclusion in reasoning.76 (Put another way, the physical processes that
cause an observer to think that the sky is blue can only lead the observer to
actually formulate that belief if he is already programmed with a particular
conceptual vocabulary. The world can cause people to formulate a belief,
but only other beliefs can actually justify the belief.) The content of an
individual episode, then, is a function of how it fits into these relations,
which implicates all that surrounds and comes before the episode as much
as anything about the physical causes or processes of the episode itself. To
know something is not to give an episode an “empirical description,” but
rather to “plac[e] it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being
able to justify what one says.”77 Hence why Sellars famously concluded,
that “all awareness . . . is a linguistic affair”—knowledge of perceptual
episodes is a function of knowing how to place those episodes in chains of
inferential reasoning.78 Language, tied together by a series of inferential
relations, makes a conceptual whole through which human beings navigate
the world.79
Robert Brandom has most extensively worked out the implications of this
inferentialism by constructing a fully expressivist account of meaning, in
which “grasping the concept that is applied in” a sentence amounts to
“mastering its inferential use.”80 Conceptual—and thus semantic—content,
he has argued, is, in character, interrelated. Because “one must have many
concepts in order to have any,” one cannot understand the content of any
one concept without “mastery of the proprieties of inference that govern the
use of other concepts and contents as well.”81 Thus, Brandom has
contended that “the inferential notion of semantic content is essentially
holistic.”82 He has revealingly elaborated,
Inferences involve both premises and conclusions. The inferential role of
one of the premises essentially depends on that of the conclusions, and
vice versa. One could not know something about the inferential role of
one content without knowing at least something about the inferential roles
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

SELLARS, supra note 28, at 32–34.
Id. at 13–25.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 76.
ROBERT B. BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO
INFERENTIALISM 11 (2000). For a suggestive take on how Brandom’s philosophy could
enhance intellectual history, see David L. Marshall, The Implications of Robert Brandom’s
Inferentialism for Intellectual History, 52 HIST. & THEORY 1 (2013).
81. ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND
DISCURSIVE COMMITMENT 89–90 (1994).
82. Id. at 90.
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of others that could be inferred from it, or from which it could be
inferred.83

As Richard Rorty put it, succinctly summing up Brandom’s insight,
“[T]he inferences drawn from and to assertions made with the sentence
constitute the only content that the sentence has.”84 By the logic of
inferentialism, successfully translating a sentence necessitates also
translating its associative relations to other sentences. Only then will its
meaning be preserved. Grasping the original meaning of any constitutional
phrase means first knowing how to use it, at its time of creation, as a
premise or conclusion in other inferences.
Philosophical holism also has targeted the meaning-belief distinction.
This distinction imagines a two-stage process in which human beings first
devise a language and next apply those meanings to the world to form
beliefs. In its most influential philosophical form, it became known as the
“analytic-synthetic distinction,” under which analytic beliefs were those
true by meaning alone, as opposed to synthetic beliefs, which were true
based on the empirical state of the world. “All bachelors are unmarried”
offered a famous example of an analytic belief (one true solely by the
meaning of the words), while “there are some bachelors” offered an
example of a synthetic belief (one true not because of what the words meant
but because of a contingent state of the world). But W. V. O. Quine
famously upended this distinction by suggesting that there was no such
categorical distinction to be drawn between analytic and synthetic
statements. He showed that when confronted with recalcitrant experiences
that challenge established beliefs, adjustments in meaning or belief could
both just as successfully accommodate a novel experience.85 Rather than
being prior to beliefs, meanings are inextricably intertwined with beliefs in
a single, holistic understanding of human rationality. Astutely drawing out
these broader implications, Brandom has asserted, “[T]o understand natural
languages, we have to understand how the one thing we do, use the
language, can serve at once to settle the meanings of our expressions and
determine which of them we take to be true.”86 In other words, meaning
cannot be discerned independent of belief. Language use (applying
meanings to form beliefs) is, contrary to what atomists maintain, a unitary,
indivisible process.
The interdependence of meaning and belief has been explored most
extensively by Davidson, specifically in his discussion of “radical
interpretation” (which was built on Quine’s “radical translation”), in which
he sought to understand how one could interpret the meanings of people
whose language was completely unknown.87 His goal was to expose the
83. Id.
84. Rorty, supra note 59, at 120, 123.
85. See generally W. V. O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL
POINT OF VIEW: LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 20 (1953).
86. BRANDOM, supra note 28, at 25.
87. See generally Davidson, supra note 36, at 125; W. V. O. Quine, Translation and
Meaning, in WORD AND OBJECT 26 (1960).

954

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

knowledge upon which all linguistic understanding is based, to capture the
problem of translation in its purest form. But his project also promised
more general insights about translation and meaning. As he put it, “The
problem of interpretation is domestic as well as foreign . . . [a]ll
understanding of the speech of another involves radical interpretation.”88
He concluded that decoding the meanings of another’s utterances
necessarily relies upon an entwined project of ascribing beliefs by realizing
that “radical interpretation” necessarily entails the “principle of charity.”89
An interpreter would need to supply some basic beliefs to begin hashing out
the speaker’s meanings by determining when a speaker had at least acceded
to certain sentences, even if they remained unknown sentences.90 From
there, one could supply enough working beliefs to allow for the
establishment of enough provisional meanings to then refine the nowexistent working theory of belief, through which the now-existent working
theory of meaning could be further refined, and so on. Interpreting the
speech of another “from scratch” showed how fundamentally intertwined
meaning and belief were. Meanings could only be understood against a
background of assumed belief, and beliefs could only be understood against
a background of assumed meanings. The two formed an “interlocked”
whole, because “[e]ach interpretation and attribution of attitude is a move
within a holistic theory.”91
The implications of these reflections for a proper understanding of
constitutional originalism are momentous. For if meaning and belief are
intertwined, then even if public meaning originalists insist that neither
subjective intents nor purposes play any role in the discovery of original
meaning, they still must concede that a wider understanding of commonly
held Founding-era beliefs plays a constitutive role. It is impossible to hash
out the meaning of any utterance without understanding the background of
beliefs against which it was set. Deducing what a speaker means is
unfeasible without understanding what the speaker might believe. I say
“might” because even if the listener does not know what the speaker
actually believes (what public meaning originalists are loathe to legitimize),
the listener must still have familiarity with the kind of historically specific
beliefs that otherwise inform the utterance to properly deduce its meaning.
Meaning and belief, quite simply, are inextricably intertwined. To invoke
one nontrivial example: even if it is reasonable to bracket Madison and his
congressional peers’ intent in drafting what became the Second
Amendment, it is not possible to bracket the general constellation of beliefs
(widely held circa 1791) from which anybody at the time would have relied
to give its wording meaning. Only through a deep inquiry into the period’s
unfamiliar beliefs can one decipher the period’s unfamiliar meanings. As
Davidson surmised: “Perhaps there are some who think it would be
possible to establish the correctness of a theory of interpretation without
88.
89.
90.
91.

DAVIDSON, supra note 36, at 125.
Id. at xviii–xx, 36.
Id. at xviii–xx, 27.
Id. at 154.
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knowing, or establishing, a great deal about beliefs, but it is not easy to
imagine how it could be done.”92 If it seems possible to public meaning
originalists, then that is only because they have not, as Davidson put it,
“ke[pt] assumptions from going unnoticed” by unwittingly supplying
modern beliefs as the necessary background against which meanings are
stabilized.93 Not only, then, have originalists been prone to impose modern
language games on eighteenth-century utterances, but they have been prone
to impose modern beliefs on them as well. In so doing, they insure that
they never, in fact, read the original Constitution at all.
CONCLUSION
Translation must run deeper than the atomistic meanings of words, no
matter how extensive the array of examples from which that analysis is
culled. The amount of evidence is not the issue—the object of
interpretation is. Systematically recovering the original meaning of
Founding-era utterances requires translating eighteenth-century language
holistically. Only then can we recover the connective tissue that linked one
meaning to the next and the web of inferential relations that gave individual
utterances their specific content.
Getting at this holism can only be done by recreating the debates in
which key constitutional terms were implicated in considerable detail.94
Any thickly historicist study of the Founding period has attended to such
debates—sometimes to trace intellectual influences or to detect personal or
political motives, but always to situate meaning in the flow of discursive
activity.95 Nothing can substitute for carefully working through the logic of
whole arguments. Because not only will the inferential content of
expressions become clear, but so too will the broader architecture of
meaning. Only then will the hidden presuppositions and silent logical
connectives begin to emerge. Wittgenstein suggested that we habitually
learn language games from within.96 We only come in contact with
grammar through cases. We should heed that advice and recreate the
Founding era’s games and attendant practices from within—based on real
moves within them.
No doubt the work will be demanding. Learning how to make moves in
such games is tantamount to mastering a conceptual vocabulary. One must
take up residence with the natives, painstakingly observing their linguistic
behavior to learn how to speak as they once did. But there is no credible
alternative. Keyword searches or corpus linguistics will miss too much of
what went into meaning by losing sight of holistic connections between
92. Id. at 143.
93. Id. at 125.
94. For my own attempt to provide such an account, see Jonathan Gienapp, Making
Constitutional Meaning: The Removal Debate and the Birth of Constitutional Essentialism,
35 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 375 (2015).
95. The best example continues to be JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
96. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 59, § 31.
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meanings.97 Only by seeing those connections can original meaning once
again come into sight.
Regardless of whether most historians are familiar with Wittgenstein,
Davidson, or Brandom, most would recognize their lessons because they
have long been central to the rigors of historical method. Beyond Skinner,
the work of Keith Baker, J. G. A. Pocock, and Mark Bevir especially
demonstrates this fact.98 Beyond even them, though, historians do not need
to be told that thick, discursive context is indispensable to grasping the
meaning of historical utterances.
Nonetheless, showing how this
philosophy reinforces historical instinct helps sharpen the point. Linguistic
holism engenders much the same historicist perspective that historians have
long favored. Originalists should appreciate the viewpoint.
Appreciating holism and historicism only begins to reveal what is
entailed in a complete translation of Founding-era discursive practices.
But, for now, appreciating them at least shows some of the crucial
limitations of Solum and other originalists’ methods of translation,
including, especially, why targeting public meaning, despite what Solum
insists, in no way frees them from historians’ techniques. All originalists,
no matter which kind of original meaning they privilege, must demonstrate
sensitivity to historicism and holism. Which is just another way of saying
that, in order to genuinely recover the original meaning of the constitutional
text, originalists of any stripe must behave as historians.

97. Solum, Originalism and History, supra note 1, at 12–13 (encouraging these
methods).
98. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

